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THE CONFUSING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULES 608(b)
AND 609 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
DONALD H. ZEIGLER*
INTRODUCTION
In American courts virtually any person with relevant evidence is
considered competent to testify. A witness’ testimony, however, need
not be taken at face value. In addition, the opposing party may attack
the credibility of the witness in many different ways. Two of the most
important ways are to show that the witness has been convicted of a
crime or has committed prior bad acts. These two methods of impeachment are actually very similar because in both cases it is the prior
acts of misconduct that bear on credibility. In both instances, the opponent wants the jury to infer that a person who would engage in serious wrongdoing is not an honest, believable witness. The fact that a
witness was convicted of the prior wrongdoing is not in itself significant. What matters is that the witness did the underlying acts.
Despite the similarity of these two methods of impeachment, in
federal court they are governed by different rules with different standards. Impeachment by bad acts is governed by Rule 608(b),1 and impeachment by convictions is governed by Rule 609.2 My thesis is that
those charged with amending the rules, or the courts, or both, should
take steps to harmonize the standards for impeachment by bad acts
and convictions. Some differences must remain for sound policy reasons, but other differences are illogical and lead to mischief and
injustice.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will very briefly review historical
practice. Traditionally, American courts treated these two methods of
impeachment almost the same way. Many state courts - like New York,
for example - still barely distinguish between them. I will illustrate the
traditional practice by discussing a wonderful old case from New Mex* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Amherst, A.B. 1966; Columbia J.D.
1969. Specialist in evidence and federal courts, with experience in Special Litigation
Unit of the Legal Aid Society. Associate Professor and Professor at Pace University
School of Law, 1978-85.
1. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
2. FED. R. EVID. 609.
527
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ico before it became a state - Territory v. Chavez,3 decided in 1896.
Next, I will explain how modern federal practice has moved away from
the traditional approach under Federal Rules 608(b) and 609. Finally,
I will suggest several ways the Rules might be changed to minimize the
inconsistencies.
I.

TRADITIONAL PRACTICE

Bad act impeachment developed first because persons convicted
of a crime were incompetent as witnesses and not allowed to testify. In
early times, a cross-examiner could ask about virtually any prior misconduct. As Wigmore states, “exploiting the witness’ life and associations, however discreditable, was freely allowed. The orthodox rule
came to be that ‘any question tending to discredit’ might be asked;
and only rarely was there any interference from the court.”4 During
the nineteenth century, most American jurisdictions abrogated the
rule making persons convicted of crime incompetent to testify and instead allowed use of convictions to impeach credibility. In addition,
with both methods of impeachment, courts began to disagree about
what sort of prior misconduct had a bearing on witness credibility.
Some courts continued to admit virtually any kind of witness misconduct to impeach, while others excluded bad acts that merely showed a
witness was a bad person and thus did not bear on credibility directly.
Despite these differences of opinion, however, individual judges did
not generally distinguish between bad acts that resulted in a criminal
conviction and those that did not. A judge favoring wide-open impeachment allowed wide-open impeachment with both bad acts and
convictions; a judge who restricted impeachment imposed similar restrictions on admission of bad acts and convictions.
This traditional practice is illustrated by Territory v. Chavez. The
defendant was charged with the murder of Gabriel Sandoval. The only
witnesses whose testimony directly connected the defendant with the
crime were Guadalupe Cabellero and Julian Trujillo. By their own testimony, they were accomplices and coconspirators in the assassination
of Sandoval. A third witness, Manuel Gonzales y Baca, testifed about
admissions made by the defendant concerning his flight from Las
Vegas after the discovery of Sandoval’s body. All three of the witnesses
3. Territory v. Chavez, 45 P. 1107 (N.M. Terr. 1896).
4. 3A JOHN A. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 986 at 857
(James H. Chadbourn, ed., rev. ed. 1970).
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against the defendant were themselves notorious outlaws. They had
numerous serious criminal convictions and had committed various
acts, criminal in nature, for which they had not been convicted. Cabellero, for example, had been convicted of larceny and sent to the penitentiary. He also was indicted for the murder of another man, Patricio
Maes, and for the murder of Sandoval, and he had pled guilty to second degree murder in both cases. Trujillo also had been convicted of
the murder of Sandoval and sent to the penitentiary. But both men
had been pardoned, apparently in exchange for testifying against Chavez. Gonzales y Baca had been indicted for robbery, cow-stealing and
for the murder of Patricio Maes, but he had never been prosecuted for
these offenses.
The trial court forbade cross-examination of the witnesses as to
any of these matters, and Chavez was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of the Territory reversed. The
Court drew a distinction between cross-examination as to trivial matters intended to embarrass a witness, which might properly be denied,
and cross-examination as to more serious wrong-doing, which should
be allowed:
Assaults upon a witness by cross-examination into collateral matters cannot be allowed to gratify the caprice or
the displeasure of those against whom he testifies; and intrusions into private affairs, which are calculated merely
to wound the feelings, humiliate, or embarrass the witness, will not be permitted . . . But a clear distinction is
to be taken between those matters . . . and . . . matters, on
the other hand, which are calculated, in an important
and material respect, to influence the credit to be given
to his testimony. As to the latter class, the witness cannot
be shielded from disclosing his own character on crossexamination, and for this purpose he may be interrogated
upon specific acts and transactions of his past life; and if
they are not too remote in time, and clearly related to the
credit of the witness, in any important and material respect, it would be error to exclude them.5

The Court did not distinguish between serious witness misconduct that
resulted in a conviction and that which did not, holding both
admissible.
5.

Chavez, 45 P. at 1108.
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FEDERAL RULES 608(B) AND 609

The Federal Rules governing impeachment by bad acts and convictions do not follow the traditional approach; instead, the Rules set
different standards for these two methods of impeachment. The differences were made greater when Rule 609 was amended in 1990 but
Rule 608 was left unchanged.
Rule 608(b), in somewhat awkward phrasing, allows “[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking . . . the
witness’ credibility . . . in the discretion of the court, if probative of . . .
untruthfulness [to be] inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for . . . untruthfulness.”6
The Rule does not specify what “instances of conduct” are probative of
untruthfulness, which leaves individual federal judges with enormous
discretion in defining the scope of permissible cross-examination
under the Rule. Nor does the Rule require that the bad acts reflect
serious wrongdoing. The acts need not even be criminal in nature. In
addition, the Rule does not distinguish between a criminal defendant
and other witnesses, despite the fact that an accused faces a greater
danger of unfair prejudice than other parties or witnesses in criminal
or civil cases from introduction of prior acts of misconduct.7 The Advisory Committee Note to 608(b) does state that the Rule is subject to
“the overriding protection” of Rules 403 and 611.8 Under Rule 403,
however, the burden is on the party opposing impeachment to establish that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value on the issue of the witness’ credibility.9 This is a heavy
burden to sustain. Rule 611(a) states that the court “shall exercise reasonable control over the mode . . . of interrogating witnesses so as to
. . . (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”10
This Rule is quite vague and also does not differentiate between an
accused and other witnesses.
Rule 609, by contrast, makes it more difficult to impeach an accused than to impeach other witnesses with a conviction. Evidence
6. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
7. The danger to an accused is essentially two-fold: (1) the jury may convict the
defendant for being a bad person without carefully scrutinizing the evidence in the
present case; and (2) the jury may wish to convict in the present case to punish the
defendant for his past wrongdoing.
8. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s note.
9. FED. R. EVID. 403.
10. FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
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that an accused has a conviction can be admitted “if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the accused.”11 Thus, the burden is on the prosecutor to demonstrate that probity outweighs prejudice. Evidence that
a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime “shall be
admitted, subject to Rule 403.”12 This language places the burden on
the party opposing impeachment to demonstrate that the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value on the issue of
the witness’ credibility. As with Rule 608(b), Rule 609 provides no guidance in determining what sorts of convictions are probative of credibility, thus leaving trial courts with enormous discretion in defining
the permissible scope of cross-examination. Unlike Rule 608(b), however, impeachment with a conviction under 609(a)(1) is limited to felony convictions, thus excluding evidence of less serious wrongdoing.
Finally, Rule 609(a)(2) allows impeachment with any crime involving
dishonesty or false statement. Under this provision, any witness, including an accused, can be impeached. The cross-examiner can ask
about any conviction, felony or misdemeanor, and the courts have
held that the party opposing impeachment cannot request exclusion
under Rule 403.13 The reason for such easy admissibility is that crimes
such as perjury, fraud, and embezzlement are thought to be particularly probative of credibility.
III.

HARMONIZING

THE

RULES

The different standards for impeachment with bad acts and convictions have caused inconsistency, mischief, and injustice. Thus, it
makes sense to harmonize the Rules as far as possible to lessen these
problems. I have several suggestions. First, the same misconduct
should be admissible - or inadmissible - under both Rules to impeach a
witness’ credibility. Second, the burdens of proof and substantive standards of 609(a)(1) should be read into Rule 608(b). Third, convictions automatically admissible under 609(a)(2) should be strictly
limited to crimes that go directly to false statement and dishonesty.
Fourth (and this is a related point), the standard of proof mandated by
11. FED. R. EVID. 609.
12. Id.
13. See United States v. Tracey, 36 F.3d 187, 192 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v.
Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 228 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 50102 (7th Cir. 1984) (all holding convictions involving dishonesty or false statement admissible without recourse to Rule 403 balancing).
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Huddleston v. United States 14 for admission of prior bad acts under FRE
404(b) should also be applied to admission of bad acts for impeachment under Rule 608(b).
The case for making the same prior misconduct admissible under
both rules whether it resulted in a conviction or not is straightforward.
What bears on a witness’ credibility is the bad deed, not the fact of the
conviction for the deed. A conviction (whether by trial or guilty plea)
may make us more confident that the witness actually did the bad
deed, but it adds nothing to the deed’s probity on credibility. Consequently, the same misconduct should be admissible under both
rules.15
Consistency can of course be achieved in two ways. One might
make 608(b) more like 609 or make 609 more like 608(b). The former makes more sense given the 1990 amendment to Rule 609. The
amendment clarified an ambiguity in the Rule as to the relationship of
Rules 609 and 403 with respect to impeachment of witnesses other
than the accused and affirmed the special protection afforded to defendants in criminal cases. Indeed, the Advisory Committee’s Note
specifically discussed the “unique risk of prejudice” faced by an accused.16 Since the risk is the same with impeachment by bad acts, particularly if the misconduct was criminal in nature, failure similarly to
amend Rule 608(b) seems an odd oversight.
The different standards under 608(b) and 609 have resulted in
some mischief. One example is the so-called “back door” practice by
which a prosecutor barred from impeaching an accused with a conviction under Rule 609 can ask about the facts underlying the conviction
under Rule 608(b). Imagine a case where a defendant is on trial for
robbery and he has a conviction for robbery. Assume that the trial
judge believes that a robbery conviction demonstrates a blatant disregard of the law and thus is very probative of the defendant’s credibility.
But the conviction is for exactly the same crime as the current charge,
and the judge also believes that the danger of unfair prejudice to the
accused is high. Reluctantly, the judge concludes that the prosecutor
14. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
15. This suggestion does not address what conduct should be considered probative of untruthfulness. Lawyers and judges have disagreed on this question for hundreds of years. The disagreement kept Congress from deciding the question when it
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. I suggest only that whether a judge holds a
broad or narrow view of what conduct is probative of untruthfulness, she apply that view
consistently to both bad act and conviction impeachment.
16. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note.
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has not met his burden under 609(a)(1) of demonstrating that the
probative value on the issue of credibility outweighs prejudice to the
accused.
The prosecutor then proposes to ask not about the conviction, but
rather about the acts underlying the conviction. He wants to ask, “Isn’t
it true that on the evening of October 10, 2001, at the corner of Broadway and Worth, you stole $150 from John Jones by threatening him
with a loaded 38 caliber pistol?” The prosecutor argues that under
Rule 608(b) the burden is now on the accused under Rule 403 to
demonstrate that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value. Because the judge found probity and
prejudice quite evenly balanced under Rule 609, the defendant is unable to sustain his high burden under Rule 608(b). As it happens, many
trial judges accept this sort of argument.
There are also many additional advantages to the prosecutor in
proceeding by the back door. First, Rule 609(b) bars convictions more
than 10 years old unless a special showing is made, but 608(b) contains
no such limitation. The phrase “in the discretion of the court”17 in
608(b) was inserted in the rule by Congress to give courts discretion to
exclude prior bad acts that are remote in time, but without a specific
year limit, courts obviously can admit bad acts more than 10 years old.
Second, questions about convictions are usually limited to asking about
the conviction itself - “Isn’t it true that you were convicted of armed
robbery?” - and questions about the underlying acts are not allowed.
Under Rule 608(b), the questioner can ask about the underlying acts,
which gives the questioner a real advantage if the acts are particularly
vicious or disgusting. Third, Rule 609(a)(1) limits impeachment to felony convictions. Rule 608(b) contains no such limitation, so the questioner can ask about the specific acts underlying a misdemeanor
conviction as long as she doesn’t mention the conviction.
My third suggestion is that courts construe Rule 609(a)(2) narrowly so that only crimes directly involving dishonesty and false statement may be admitted. While Rule 609(a)(2) and Rule 608(b) would
still be inconsistent, strict construction of 609(a)(2) would make the
two rules more consistent in practice. The inconsistency in the rules
comes from the fact that convictions involving dishonesty or false statement are automatically admissible without any Rule 403 balancing,
while the same misconduct not resulting in a conviction can be ex17.

FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
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cluded under Rule 403. If courts construe Rule 609(a)(2) narrowly so
that only those crimes that are most relevant to credibility are admitted, it seems unlikely that courts would often bar cross-examination
about the same bad acts that did not happen to result in a conviction.
The party opposing impeachment would be hard pressed to convince a
court that if a witness has committed perjury or embezzled funds he
should not be asked about it because the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs probity.
My final suggestion is to impose the standard of proof from Huddleston v. United States to Rule 608(b). In Huddleston, the Supreme
Court held that to admit a bad act for a permissible 404(b) purpose
(such as to show intent, knowledge, plan, preparation, etc.), the proponent had to present evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case
that the bad act actually happened.18 A prima facie case is enough
evidence from which a reasonable juror might conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the act happened. The Court reasoned
that if no reasonable juror could conclude by a preponderance that
the act occurred, then the act was not relevant and should be excluded. The current standard for asking about bad acts for impeachment purposes under Rule 608(b) is a “good faith” standard.19 This
standard is obviously vague and invites abuse. What is a good faith
basis for an inquiry about a bad act? Hearsay? Triple hearsay? Gutter
rumor? Talk around the station house? No one knows. Use of the
Huddleston standard would help insure that there is a basis in fact for
bad acts admitted for impeachment purposes.
CONCLUSION
Rules 608(b) and 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence contain
very different standards for impeachment by bad acts and convictions.
The Rules should be harmonized to insure consistent, fair
impeachment.

18.
19.

485 U.S. at 689.
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).

